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Rhetoric enters into economics frequently at the junctures of alternative 
government policies and debates grounding competing theories of 
unexpected events and prudent solutions.  When economies turn in 
widely unanticipated directions, critical discussions arise to spark 
questions about the legitimacy, power, and correctness of policy response.    
In October 1932, there appeared in The Times of London a series of 
brief letter exchanges signed by John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich 
August von Hayek (along with some of their associates) in which 
alternative explanations were defended about the causes of economic 
activity.  Those explanations were grounded in macro- and micro-
economics, which in the terms of the 1930s were contested as trade cycle 
or monetary theories (Rizzo, 2009).  Also at issue, however, was a choice 
between alternative strategies of political economy.   Nineteen thirty-two 
appeared to be a time of nascent recovery from the effects of falling equity 
values, but also could be seen as the beginning of a new era of trade 
protectionism and monetary contraction.   One policy choice was for 
governments to distribute tax or printed money to citizens in the form of 
unemployment insurance or guaranteed employment programs to 
supplement private spending.  Another was for governments to exercise 
restraint in borrowing and spending and let private capital adjust 
economies to new productive levels by securing good investments over 
time.  While the subsequent decisions of the British government 
conformed to neither choice unequivocally, the events of the Great 
Depression that followed have at various times been appropriated by 
Hayek and Keynes’ successors as evidence that the theoretical arguments 
of one or other have been vindicated by collective experience. 
The present day is another time in which theoretical controversy and 
alternative practices are conjoined.  Named by some as “the Great 
Recession,” the period that began in 2008 has seen accelerating rates of 
defaults on loan repayments, job layoffs, financial institutional distress, 
and speculative shortselling of sovereign debt.  But this moment has also 
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been articulated as the initiation of a new process of recovery. “The news 
media are singularly lacking in any explanation for the recent resurgence 
of the world economy beyond the improvement in leading indicators, 
such as stock market prices and retail sales numbers” (Akerlof & Shiller, 
2010, vii).   
Conflicting appearances spark economic uncertainty, and when 
security falls, a boom time for economic debates flourishes. Contestation 
over the relation between theory, policy and practice articulate different, 
competing ways of envisioning ideal relationships among economics, 
markets, and state intervention as well as dramatizing the hazards of 
turning toward greater hazard.  In such debates, the previous positions 
are revisited and resurrected to lay on the table argument, informed 
authority, and precedent.  Thus, the 1932 debate between Keynes and 
Hayek has been invoked recently, in fact, not so much to recoup places of 
agreement or unique contributions to re-envisioning the relationship 
between theory and practice as to polarize positions and situate the 
dispute within a left-wing or right-wing policy presumption. Within such 
frameworks, advocates now jockey for advantage by declaring: 
(1) they are faithful followers of the doctrines of Hayek or Keynes,  
(2) that the times demand strict adherence to true principles, and  
(3) that cataclysmic outcomes await those who hesitate or chose the 
other side.   
Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr., a former vice president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas and now a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, for example, 
points to “newly discovered letters” from The Times of London 
(MacGregor et al., “Private Spending”, 1932a; Gregory et al., 1932) in 
order to insist that if Hayek were alive today, he would demand that 
efforts at economic stimulus be abandoned and that the global trading 
system be reinvigorated by removing all remaining barriers to open trade.  
Even if Keynes were right—a claim admitted only as a counterfactual in 
O’Driscoll’s editorial-- President Obama, says O’Driscoll, is not following 
either Hayek or Keynes because he is “demonizing business and creating 
regime uncertainty through new programs and costly regulations,” which 
engenders a loss of confidence not part of either economist’s project.   On 
the other side, Paul Krugman, Nobel Laureate and economics professor at 
Princeton, has reviewed the “dueling letters” on his New York Times blog.  
He describes Hayek’s claim that barriers to trade and capital movement 
were preventing recovery as “crazy” (Krugman, 2010).  Krugman credits 
Keynes with having worked out almost all of the policy implications of The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (published in 1936) 
by 1932, including the insight that both higher private and higher public 
spending expand employment in a slump. Krugman expresses regrets that 
a debate concluded is now being restaged. 
We rejoin the debate between Hayek and Keynes, in part, to repair the 
binaries and polarities within which theorist has been cast by subsequent, 
polarized advocates of political economy.  Within the larger contexts of 
their 1932 exchange, it turns out that Hayek is not a right-wing hero, any 
more than Keynes is a liberal managerial technician, removed from 
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institutional constraints.  Of course, economic theories can be read as a 
linear, progressive history of ideas. The situated qualities of argument are 
shaved away to leave the form of causal order in defining the basic, 
underlying principles of exchange.  Such foundational work yields the 
promise of control--with ever greater degrees of power and reliability—
over markets and economic activity.  Older views, inadequate to the 
broadening scope and narrowing precision of advancing theories, then, 
can be distilled to essence, particulars of context abandoned, and the 
specifics of argument consigned to the waste bin of history without loss.  
That is not, however, our reading strategy.  We prefer to begin from the 
assumption that humans are self-constituting, and therefore economic 
theories can be re-popularized in a new age, and theoretical controversies 
can reappear.  Different groups engage in appropriation or critique of 
those theories to gain argumentative standing and to strive for advantage.  
Critical engagement with situated texts is necessary to repair 
appropriations of theory that unproductively curtail and limit the range of 
rhetorical aspects of theoretical disputes that respond to mixed and self-
constituting rather than essentialized and purified polarizations to claim 
public authority. 
In this respect our aim is to extend other work of our colleagues that 
appears in this edition of the POROI journal.  McCloskey and Lyne in 
their dialogue, and in their articles Ramos and Mirowski, as well as 
Depew, look at the rhetoricity of practices internal to the texts of social 
discourse.  Each of our strategies follows a parallel track, developing 
positions, putting them in rhetorical terms, and creating new directions 
for belief and action.  In the following review, we set the context for the 
articulation of economic debate in the uncertain transitional political 
economy during a turn from the market values from war time savings to 
domestic consumption; then, explicate the positions of Keynes and Hayek 
within this uncertain context of transition during the Depression; and, 
finally reconstruct and recover Hayek's position in relation to 
contemporary debates in the articulation of economic value.  The close 
reading of the 1932 debate in context thus enables a broader recovery of 
Hayek's theories of economy in relation to contemporary practice.  To be 
sure, oppositional grounds remain at the level of the means of 
intervention and the sources of uncertainty between Hayek and Keyes; 
however, there is sufficient common grounds between these modern 
economists to offer grounds for a consensus on crucial public policy-
regulating practice and to resist polarization in the interests of partisan 
power and expert authority. 
 
Setting the Rhetorical Stage for the 1932 Keynes – Hayek 
Letter Exchange  
Seven years before his date of destiny with Adolf Hitler and before he 
declared “peace in our time,” Neville Chamberlain assumed the post of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer when the Conservative coalition ousted the 
Labor Party from voting control in Parliament.  The UK had experienced 
hard economic times for several years, and the members of the Labor 
Party Cabinet were unable to articulate a theory and practical plan for 
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reversing the downturn.  The victorious Conservative coalition insisted 
that the first step was to put in place new fiscal austerity measures.  The 
supplementary budget proposed on September 10, 1931 combined a 35 
million pound cut in unemployment benefits and public sector wages, a 
refinancing of 22 million pounds of War Loans to take advantage of lower 
interest rates, and a tax increase of 40 million pounds.  Chamberlain 
worked to push the proposal through the political process, and announced 
on April 19, 1932 that the budget had been balanced with a small surplus 
(Morton, 1943, 70-71).  On the basis of this accomplishment, Time 
Magazine considered Chamberlain (“Britain’s Strong Man”) for Man of 
the Year 1932, although the award eluded him until 1938.  But 
Chamberlain recognized that the tax increase was alienating tax-paying 
supporters of the Party and decided to leave open some hope for future 
tax relief connected to further budget cuts.  In a May 10, 1932 speech at 
the Bankers’ Dinner he observed that taxpayers were “crying out for still 
further efforts at economy,” but that “real effective relief to the taxpayer” 
would require a more comprehensive debt reduction pact than was 
currently being contemplated (Morton, 1943, 71).  During the same 
period, however, Chamberlain also introduced a 10% general tariff in an 
effort to rectify an adverse balance of trade by diminishing imports and 
encouraging domestic manufactures, which became effective on March 1.  
There is support, then, for the belief that Chamberlain carried out an 
economic policy during a world recession that placed the burden of 
adjustment primarily upon ordinary UK citizens by reducing public 
employment and welfare payments, decreasing the interest rate on war 
bonds, and increasing taxes and the prices of imported goods.  How was 
this onerous set of impositions justified?  An examination of 
Chamberlain’s exemplary June 30 address to the House of Commons on 
war bond conversion, which appears to have stimulated the series of 
London Times letters to the editor beginning on July 5 and so leading to 
the Keynes-Hayek exchange in October, suggests that the onerous was 
grounded in appeals to the honorable.  Chamberlain appeals, for example, 
to the “good sense and patriotism” of those holding war bonds.  The good 
sense consisted of an understanding that the high rate of interest (5%) 
payable on the bonds was greater than comparable rates of return on 
other securities and that these high-interest war bonds depressed both 
competing investments and trade.  There was also a negative inducement 
to good sense.  The government would find other ways to extinguish the 
debt if the bondholders did not agree to the conversion.  The invocation of 
patriotic duty was an extension of government appeals during wartime 
encouraging British citizens to put their surplus funds in war bonds so 
that the government could commandeer resources needed for the war 
effort.  In the current situation, “economy is an urgent matter, and this 
scheme, effecting so great a reduction in our interest charges, is an 
essential element in any economy proposals” (Chamberlain, 1932b).  
Britain’s budget and trade problems, then, justified wartime measures 
and, in particular, called upon consumers to tighten their belts and 
donate the surplus to the government at lower rates.  The appeal was 
effective; 92% of war bondholders accepted the lower interest rates 
(although even the new interest rate of 3.5% was better than what the 
average investor could obtain elsewhere) (Leaviss, 2010). 
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Chamberlain’s rhetorical strategy seemed to participate in a 
productive conflation of “economy” as a financial entity or process with 
“economy” conceived as concern for or means to reducing government 
expenditure or “economizing.”  In a July 11 appearance before the House 
of Commons Chamberlain attacked an opponent on the “question of 
economy”: 
I think, however, that the purpose of to-day's discussion was 
understood to revolve around the question of economy. The hon. 
and learned Member for East Bristol said that economy was the 
reverse of the right policy for the Government of this country, 
from which I conclude that the converse is true, and that in his 
opinion the right policy for this country is one of extravagance. 
(Chamberlain, 1932a). 
From this perspective, the role of political economists must be to preserve 
the economy by economizing on government expenditures.  Austerity and 
prosperity are coincident. 
The financial austerity program was accompanied by continuation of 
the monetary contraction the UK had experienced while the government 
preserved the gold standard during the economically difficult period 
between 1929 and 1931.  In spite of the UK government’s decision to 
abandon the gold standard in mid-1931, the earning assets of London 
clearing banks decreased by an additional 3% between September 1931 
and May 1932 (Morton, 1943, 47).  They did so perhaps in part because in 
response to the decision to abandon the gold standard the Bank of 
England raised the discount rate from 4.5 to 6% out of a fear of inflation.  
On February 18, the Bank began to reduce the discount rate, eventually 
reaching 2% on June 30.  But by then the short-term economic damage 
had been done.  Furthermore, Chamberlain made a decision to begin a 
policy of “quantitative easing” in May as a way to create “cheap money” 
that would be necessary to help finance the war bond conversion 
program.  But “quantitative easing” did not guarantee increased business 
investment because during the war bond refinancing period (June to 
September 1932) private investors were prohibited from issuing new 
securities.  Investment was further inhibited by the uncertainty as to 
whether war bond refinancing would be sufficient to achieve its goals 
(Morton, 1943, 250-251).  Thus, although UK banks began to buy 
government securities at a rapid rate thereafter and liquidity increased 
substantially in 1933, the combination of fiscal austerity and discount rate 
increases in mid-1932 seemed to promise yet more deflation.  
It was against this background that on July 5, 1932, The Times of 
London published a letter to the editor signed by 41 prominent economics 
professors across the UK, including Keynes.  The letter blamed “the great 
fall in wholesale prices” since 1930 for the most serious evil of the 
economic crisis.  Although some prices can adjust downward as well as 
upward in response to supply and demand changes, it was claimed, other 
prices were “relatively inflexible,” thereby creating “serious 
maladjustments throughout the economic system.”  Those prices that are 
adjustable, then, need to be raised to where they were before the crisis 
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began.  This could be done by private spending, monetary easing, tax 
rebates, and public investment. 
The choice to emphasize private spending on the list of actions needed 
to achieve re-inflation was part of the letter’s effort to reverse the 
equation of private austerity with the appeal to patriotism that had 
worked so well for Chamberlain.  Under the heading “Fresh Money for 
Spending,” the letter exhorted private individuals and institutions to 
assist “by spending money according to their capacity.”  The sentence 
following this passage is explicit about how presumptions about capacity 
to spend should be set:  “In cases of doubt, the patriotic motive should 
weigh on the side of expenditures rather than economy.”  Finally, the 
government should alleviate the sense of uncertainty that was provoking 
public fears of inflation by declaring its commitment to this new policy in 
advance, and not use re-inflation as an excuse to engage in competitive 
devaluation of the pound, which would worsen the world situation (Allen, 
et al., 1932). 
More letters published in The Times of London on July 7, 1932 took a 
different tack.  They recognized and called out the effort to change the 
existing presumption in favor of economy in the sense of economizing. 
They mustered once more the claims about the effects of the Great War 
on postwar British economic resources, adding to that patriotic 
invocation the uncertainty about the ultimate status of British war debt to 
the United States, which had been suspended since 1931.   The public 
must not “relax its sense of corporate gravity and launch out on a course 
of what, outside of seminars for optimistic undergraduates who know the 
otherworldliness of their teachers, may be taken for an authorized and 
altogether indulgence of their private tastes and capacity for wheedling 
loans at interest out of bank managers” (Newbold, 1932).  Another letter 
insisted that no “representative body of opinion” would respect re-
inflation in light of the psychological danger of “fear and uncertainty 
always attending suggestions of inflation” (Coxall, 1932).  These opinions, 
insulting as they might seem to prominent economists, were in line with 
the official editorial position of The Times of London, which continued to 
publish essays in support of “strict economy” and “wise spending” over 
the next few months. 
Nevertheless, the notion that it might actually be the patriotic duty of 
UK citizens to spend rather than to hoard money or return funds to the 
government had been planted, and its seeds sprouted further missives at 
the conclusion of the War Loan conversion program in early October.  A 
World War I RAF pilot, P. W. Petter, wrote a letter that appeared on 
October 7 on how the British government’s success in the war loan 
conversion program constituted a justification for a national effort to 
increase private spending, with possible supplementation from public 
expenditure (Petter, 1932).  C. H. St. John Hornby, a prominent private 
book publisher, placed a letter on October 11 that agreed with Petter that 
“wise spending” by individuals is that which employs as many people as 
possible and called upon economists to draw up a scheme which would 
make such a determination.  Hornby makes reference to the persuasive 
effect that the previous phrase regime of “economy” had upon private 
spending:  
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 So much has been written and spoken about economy during the 
past 12 months that most people seem to be imbued with the idea 
that they are performing a public service by buttoning up their 
pockets, whether they have money to spend or not . . .Words are 
dangerous things, and not the least dangerous is the word 
“economy” in the mouths of those who do not realize its full 
implications (Hornby, 1932). 
After citing the July 5 letter, which he did not feel safe to sign, Oxford 
professor of political economy D. H. Macgregor continued that letter’s 
argument in an October 13 submission by co-opting the force of the word 
“economy” by differentiating its meaning from “parcimony” [sic] to 
associate economy with the project of re-inflation, by means in part of 
public expenditures: 
 
Economy has two opposite, waste and parcimony [sic].  If we 
reduce waste where we can it should be to free resources for 
remunerative spending.  This applies to both public and private 
enterprise. . . Just because depression means uncertainty, the 
private buyer is disposed to save beyond normal.  This special 
parcimony, with its cumulative results, needs a special 
counterpoise.  Otherwise we shall spend our substance in riotous 
saving.  We cannot afford to wait for the boll weevil or a drought 
to rescue prices (Macgregor, 1932). 
William Dampier, British scientist and first secretary to the UK 
Agricultural Research Council, theorized the rules of “economical” private 
spending and connected them to re-inflation: 
 
Thus I conclude, first, that the nation and the individual should, 
now as always, avoid waste, get the best value for their money, 
and save, but only save as far as they can find remunerative new 
investments in public works or private enterprise.  Secondly, I 
think that, as long as we are in danger of a further fall in the price 
level of primary commodities—an increase in the value of 
money—it is dangerous to carry saving beyond that amount 
(Dampier, 1932).  
All of these letters to The Times of London preceded the beginning of 
what other scholars have identified as the “Keynes-Hayek debate of 1932.”  
As we discuss below, they set the stage and the parameters for that debate 
and the theoretical work that followed.  By distancing the experiences of 
citizens in the economic conditions of the 1930s from those occasioned by 
the Great War, these letters initiated the dissociation of patriotism from 
private parsimony.  Moreover, by playing on the denotations and 
connotations of the word “economy,” they reversed the previously 
productive equation of parsimony with economy by recognizing the equal 
accuracy of conditioning the value of saving money on the successful 
functioning of the “economy” as a whole.  By reframing the problem of 
“uncertainty” from one that justified private hoarding to one that entailed 
countervailing risks of over- and under-spending to be evaluated and 
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weighed through public argument they created an opportunity for Keynes 
and Hayek to connect their theorizing activities to a live public 
controversy.  Nevertheless, the arguments articulated in these letters were 
linked to a particular proposal of “price re-inflation,” which potentially 
limited the generalizability of the economic explanations and 
justifications to other situations.  The subsequent contributions of Keynes 
and his colleagues and Hayek and his colleagues opened the horizon for 
theorizing the implications of economic uncertainty on consumption, 
saving, investment, and supply and demand for money in ways that could 
be cited and applied in future controversies. 
 
The Keynes-Hayek Debate in The Times of London 
At the time of the exchange of letters, neither Hayek nor Keynes had 
published the works of economic theory for which they would become 
most famous.  Hayek had just arrived in London from Austria in 1931, 
taking an academic position at the London School of Economics.  He had 
published Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle and Prices and 
Production, which began the development of his monetary theory of 
business cycles.  Keynes, in his academic position at Cambridge and as an 
informal governmental advisor, had published a series of pamphlets on 
specific economic issues, his Treatise on Probability, his Treatise on 
Money, and a volume of policy essays entitled Essays in Persuasion.  The 
Treatise on Money (1930) was the longest work of the group and most 
directly related to political economy.  It set out Keynes’s early views on the 
differences in motivation between savings and investment which prevents 
their automatic equalization in a credit money economy, as well as his 
attempt to formalize in a set of equations how an economy moves from 
one price level to another (Skidelsky, 2010, 70-72).  Hayek had critiqued 
the Treatise on Money in an August 1931 article in the journal 
Economica, to which Keynes replied that the Treatise no longer 
represented his economic views.  At about the same time, Keynes changed 
the title of his October 1932 Cambridge lecture series from “The Pure 
Theory of Money,” the subtitle of the first volume of the Treatise, to “The 
Monetary Theory of Production” (Skidelsky, 2010, 83). 
Keynes was not the chief signatory to the letter that initiated the 
debate on October 17.  Rather, it was D. H. Macgregor, who had 
submitted the October 13 letter that connected the October dispute over 
private and public spending to the July 5 letter signed by 41 economists.  
The style of much of the October 13 letter seems to reflect MacGregor’s 
concerns and rhetorical strategy, but the latter half includes a brief 
unfolding of Keynes’ convoluted theory of differential motives for savings 
and investment and connects it to the demand for money. 
The letter’s first paragraph accepts Hornby’s invitation to develop a 
perspective on the problem of private spending, and claims that this view 
is one with which most British economists would not disagree.  Then the 
text moves to the issue of patriotism and the comparison of the exigencies 
of the War economy with the Depression economy.  “In the period of the 
War it was a patriotic duty for private citizens to cut their expenditure on 
the purchase of consumable goods and services to the limit of their 
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power” (MacGregor et al., 1932a).  But the resources freed up were used 
by the government to conduct war.  “At the present time, the conditions 
are entirely different” (MacGregor et al., 1932a).  The retained resources 
are not used for war, or, quite possibly, for any other productive purpose.  
What characterizes the depression economy is paralyzing uncertainty, or 
a lack of confidence, that discourages people both from buying securities 
and from investing borrowed money in factories and machinery to make 
consumer.   
In attempting to explain why demand for consumer goods deserves 
such a central role in the determination of national income, the letter 
draws upon Keynes’ differential motivation position.  It figures demand 
for consumer goods as the starting point for decisions by the consumers 
to save money that can be used for investment in future production 
(MacGregor et al., 1932a).   This reverses the traditional ordering 
principle of Say’s Law, which posits that supply calls forth its own 
demand, by imagining that consumers plan for their own future 
consumption by directly or indirectly making funds available to producers 
for capital purchases.  An increase in personal savings through “bank 
balances or even in the purchase of existing securities,” then, would be 
associated with a decreased desire or propensity to consume in the future.  
Thus, private “economy,” or hoarding of money, “cuts down the national 
income by nearly as much as it cuts down consumption” because “capital 
expenditures decisions are counting on the expected future demand” 
(MacGregor et al., 1932a).  Moreover, the complex reasons why people 
hoard money may become disconnected from the basic desire to 
consume.  By moving in the direction of motives that are a response to 
declining incomes, people who decide to hoard can cause an initial 
downturn to snowball.  This outcome returns the argument to its 
rhetorical premise:  “…to spend less money than we should like to do is 
not patriotic” (Macgregor et al., 1932a).  To the degree that Chamberlain’s 
austerity policies are encouraging this kind of individual behavior by 
higher taxes and tariffs, lower interest rates on war bonds, and reduced 
expenditures on social welfare, it contributes to unpatriotic action that 
threatens future growth. 
Because public goods are subject to similar consumption decisions as 
are private goods, this line of reasoning about the misguided nature of 
hoarding applies to decisions of local governments to refrain from 
providing essential services such as swimming pools, libraries, and 
museums.  “They will be ‘martyrs by mistake,’ and, in their martyrdom, 
will be injuring others as well as themselves.  Through their misdirected 
good will the mounting wave of unemployment will be lifted still higher” 
(Macgregor et al., 1932b).  Thus, implicitly, localities can offset the effects 
of economic distress on private spending by supplementing it with public 
expenditures that lead to a consumable good or service. 
The reply to this letter that appeared two days later in the London 
Times of October 19 placed Hayek’s signature in a position second to that 
of T. E. Gregory, the governor of the London School of Economics, but 
above that of Arnold Plant and Lionel Robbins.  Yet the organization of 
the letter suggests Hayek’s substantial involvement in its composition, 
and a continuation of his critique of Keynes’ theories in the Treatise on 
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Money.  Like a debater who wants to make the areas of difference stand 
out in a short presentation, the text divides the question into three major 
issues and purports to set forth the precise points of disagreement 
between Hayek and colleagues and Keynes and his associates.  The first 
issue involves an effort to preempt the differentiation of economy from 
parsimony that fueled criticism of the British government’s 
encouragement of reduced consumption.  The text pledges agreement 
with the view that hoarding money is deflationary, and deflation is not 
desirable in itself.   
The statement of the second issue alleges a disagreement with Keynes 
and associates about the desirability of focusing upon consumption 
spending rather than on “real investment.”  As noted previously, the 
October 17 letter classified investment in existing securities as wasted 
social expenditure because there would be no guarantee that the proceeds 
would not end up in the pockets of brokers and sellers rather than used 
for production of new goods.  The letter links the uncertainty and loss of 
confidence in financial circles resulting from the declining popularity of 
existing securities to the unlikelihood of additional instruments being 
issued.  “A rise in the value of old securities is an indispensable 
preliminary to the flotation of new issues” (Gregory et al., 1932).  Even 
suggesting the possibility that individual investors should abandon the 
stock market might hurt financial confidence under current 
circumstances.  “It is perilous in the extreme to say anything which may 
still further weaken the habit of private saving” (Gregory et al., 1932). 
The final issue concerns a difference of opinion about the relative 
investment capabilities of public and private agencies.  Here the 
signatories take advantage of the presumption given by many readers of 
The Times of London to the soundness and impartiality of its editorial 
opinions.  On Monday, October 17, the editorial on “Economy and 
Unemployment” restated the newspaper’s preference for lean government 
programs.  It indicts public employment on the grounds that the jobs are 
too costly, and that those paying taxes for them will become unemployed 
because higher taxes will discourage business and consumption.  While 
ostensibly agreeing with the Times editorial position, the October 19 letter 
transforms the question of public means of promoting employment into 
an assertion about the competency of public agencies to make any 
investments.  “We are of the opinion that many of the troubles of the 
world at the present time are due to imprudent borrowing and spending 
on the part of the public authorities.  We do not desire to see a renewal of 
such practices” (Gregory et al., 1932).  Public debt is asserted to inhibit 
adjustment to adverse economic conditions more than private debt and to 
crowd out private borrowing.  Thus any public investment that requires 
bonding must be rejected, even if “people ‘feel they want’ such amenities.”  
Governments also have the power to remove impediments to trade and 
capital investments. They should do so if they hope for economic revival 
(Gregory et al., 1932). 
Those who have chronicled the Hayek-Keynes exchange in recent 
times for its resonances with the current economic crisis have ignored the 
publication of a third letter to The Times of London by the Keynes group 
on October 21.  This letter responds most directly to a letter published on 
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October 18 by Ernest Benn, a British publisher, writer, and political 
publicist, and W. W. Paine, the general manager of Lloyds Bank, Ltd.  
Benn, at least, gave his critics reasons to suspect that his economic beliefs 
were carefully tailored to his current occupation.  He had found 
justification for state intervention when employed in the Ministry of 
Munitions and Reconstruction, but supported “undiluted laissez faire” 
when he started his publishing firm after the Great War (Abel, 1960, 11).  
The letter from Benn and Paine claims to agree that people have a duty to 
spend, but not on bonding community facilities like swimming pools, 
libraries, and museums because they draw resources that would employ 
more people and impose a debt burden on the population (Benn & Paine, 
1932). 
Yet the Keynes group letter also has something to say to the Hayek 
group’s claim about the “crowding-out” effect of public investment on 
alternative forms of employment.  Whether that claim is grounded in 
assumed limitations on an available pool of money or on a supply of 
physical resources, it is “an illusion,” as Adam Smith recognized long ago.  
Most of the value in a product, says the text, is found in the “brains, 
hands, and capital equipment of the country” (Macgregor et al., 1932b).  
These are not finite in the same sense that money or physical resource are 
because they will not be used in the absence of a deliberate decision to 
produce. “They simply do not come into existence.”  Under the 
uncertainties created by the current economic recession, capital 
investment in and production of capital goods will not trade off with 
similar activities for consumption goods, but will simply not be 
undertaken at all, idling both labor and capital (Macgregor et al., 1932b).  
The equation of capital and consumption in relation to production is 
indicated by the ease within which the letter adopts and adapts the term 
“capital goods” from neoclassical economics to reinforce the centrality of 
consumption practices.  It does so through its identification of capital as a 
“good.” 
 
Recovering Hayek for Contemporary Practice 
The Hayek-Keynes debate has been recollected and deployed for partisan 
support or opposition.  The uses of Keynes and Hayek as oppositional 
strategy thus are adduced to bear upon the contemporary economic crisis 
of the United States.  At present, the Obama Administration is said to 
follow Keynesian interventionary policy by using fiscal and monetary 
tools to stimulate spending and investment.  The critical ground opposing 
Obama appears to be drawn from Hayek (particularly as extended by 
Milton Friedman).  The Federal Reserve is pursuing a policy of 
Quantitative Easing and expanding the money supply to avoid a 
deflationary spiral and stagnation similar to the Japanese economy, since 
its bubble burst in 1997.  The reduction of the value of the dollar raises 
prospects of inflation, when demand resumes.  Inflation is one way to 
adjust great debt burdens, paying national and international creditors 
back with cheaper currency.  Inflation sometimes transitions to 
hyperinflation, a spiral of rising price expectations creates incentives for 
hoarding and price hiking in anticipation that dollars received today will 
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be worth less tomorrow.  High interest rates are the only way to disrupt 
such a spiral. So, as Ebenstein argues,  
[i]t is likely that at some point the Fed will raise interest rates and 
curtail existing measures to increase liquidity in financial 
institutions. Or it may allow prices to inflate. The United States 
could be in for a double-dip recession in which economic activity 
responds to the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus but 
then hits a wall as interest rates and prices rise. Hayek's 
adversary, Keynes, recommended fiscal policy rather than 
monetary policy as the way to steer an economy, and this seems 
to be the Obama administration's intention (Ebenstein, 2009) . 
In Europe, an era of austerity has descended in order for governments to 
create manoeuvring room for physical policy, while at the G20 summit, 
nations over split over United States’ cavalier treatment of the dollar’s 
exchange value.  Conservatives would limit government intervention into 
any economic downturn and Hayek is sited as a source that justifies such 
restraint; however, while Hayek was skeptical about central planning 
generally, careful inspection of his theory in relation to the articulation of 
constitutive practices theory nevertheless provides ample grounds for 
boundary setting and regulation of capital industries—a quite different 
matter.  
Society for Hayek is formed from a multitude of individuals who 
succeed “when their activities are mutually adjusted to one another” 
(Hayek, 1981).  Adjustment works because people “ in society can 
successfully pursue their ends because they know what to expect from 
their fellows” (Hayek, 1981).   Individuals in society 
 “can successfully pursue their ends because they know what to 
expect from their fellows. Their relations, in other words, show a 
certain order.  How such an order of the multifarious activities of 
millions of men [and women] is produced or can be achieved is 
the central problem of social theory and social policy” (Hayek, 
1981)    
The central theoretical question, thus, is how a social order made up of 
“the multifarious activities of millions of men is produced or can be 
achieved” (Hayek, 1981).  Reciprocal expectations create an on-going, 
experimental field of activities, we think, where the final product is the 
collectively endowed practices of complex market experiments.  This 
premise celebrates the productive form of knowledge generation while at 
the same time restricting the hubris of elite intervention.  Hayek draws 
support from this view from homologous arguments to human 
intervention into nature:  
We could never produce a crystal by directly placing the 
individual molecules from which it is built up. But we can create 
the conditions under which such a crystal will form itself. If for 
that purpose we make use of known forces, we can, however, not 
determine the position an individual molecule will occupy within 
a crystal, or even the size or position of the several crystals. 
Similarly, we can create the conditions under which a biological 
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organism will grow and develop. But all we can do is create 
conditions favorable to that growth, and we are able to determine 
the resulting shape and structure only within narrow limits. The 
same applies to spontaneous social orders (Hayek, 1981). 
The idea of spontaneous social order—in between design and human 
invention--slips Hayek into alignment with Milton Friedman and free-
market ideologists from Reagan-Thatcher onward. As Beichman 
contends: “because the planner cannot know relative costs and scarcities, 
the planned economy will in fact be chaotic and vastly wasteful."  
Particularly, his early Cold War text, Road to Serfdom, is celebrated 
among conservatives as “one of the foundation texts” for the movement.  
Further, “the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have 
proven the vitality and prosperity of economic freedom. Markets are the 
norm in most countries,” (Beichman, 2000, 16) Beichman concludes.  
John Gray confirms the success of the Nobel Laureate: “it turned 
out Hayek had been right all along, namely, that socialist central planning 
would not only fail but that its failure would, for the sake of regime 
survival, introduce dictatorship” (Beichman, 2000 [quoting Gray], 16). 
 The epistemic basis for Hayek was based less upon a fully articulated 
conservative ideology than on a strong presumption against restrictions of 
freedom based upon abstract, extrapolated rules.  The views are grounded 
in Karl Popper’s modernist, falsifiable thinking. Indeed, “Hayek's entire 
approach to economics, in line with the Austrian School, emphasized the 
limited nature of knowledge” (Ross, 2004). 
Yet Hayek does not ground market success and economic practice in 
natural law theories of maximizing economic freedom at the expense of 
demanding universal restrictions against state intervention; rather, he 
posits “slow evolution” as a feature of evolving economic conditions. 
Markets ”must continuously form and reform themselves,” he writes,  
“where only the conditions conducive to their constant reconstitution 
have been shaped by evolution. The genetic and the functional aspects can 
never be fully separated” (Hayek, 1981).  The experimental quality of self-
reformation sustains Hayek’s well-known animus against central 
planning, but it does not rule out the need for timely intervention on the 
part of the state when the self-adjusting processes of experimentation fail.  
What kind and upon what grounds intervention is justified needs to be 
developed from the Austrian’s views on the outer-boundaries of practice. 
The evolutionary thrust for markets occurs in rule following.  Rules may 
be implicit to a practice that everyone pursues, but no one is forced to 
think about, why individual pursuits produce a sustainable and successful 
common system is less important than the deployment and use of these 
norms and practices of deliberated conduct.  Rules form in the habits of 
individuals and collectives before reaching the stage of linguistic 
articulation--when complexity yields tensions among common forms of 
imitation, convention, and strategic manipulation. In sophisticated 
markets, issues form over basic questions. As Hayek observes,  
some such common rules the individuals will follow merely 
because of the similarity of their environment, or, rather, because 
of the similar manner in which this environment reflects itself in 
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their minds. Others they will all follow spontaneously because 
they are part of the common cultural tradition of their society. 
But there are still others which it is necessary that they be made 
to obey, since it would be in the interest of each individual to 
disregard them, though the overall order will be formed only if 
the rule is generally obeyed (Hayek, 1981)   
At this outer boundary, common law is the preferred vehicle of offsetting 
strategic manipulation because of its slow, piece by piece testing over 
time.  Hayek believes that nations that govern economic exchange 
through common law rather than civil law are more successful 
economically. 
The reasons rules emerge from practice is that knowledge within a 
market order is disbursed and distributed.  As the Austrian economist 
writes,  
the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use 
never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the 
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess (Hayek, 
1945, 519) 
Nevertheless, market agents are accorded a common sense that adjusts 
prices to value with speed and efficiency to circumstances.  A growing 
abundance decreases price because more goods are to be found as 
available; a growing scarcity increases price because fewer goods are 
available.  Thus, individual judgments reflect through combination the 
price which itself functions as a signal of rising or decreasing availability.  
Thus, even though “each entrepreneur operations within the bounds of 
his unique understanding of a particular ‘locality’, price signals encourage 
apparently independent entrepreneurial activities to become harmonised” 
(Steele, 2001, 14).   
The epistemic assumption is drawn from the classical distinction 
between ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi, that is knowledge provided 
by a sign and knowledge of the cause of the facts at hand.  The capacity of 
a rational economic actor is limited by access, constrained by selection, 
and narrowed by timeliness.  Entrepreneurs do not need theoretical 
knowledge to explain why a certain trajectory of choices is beginning to 
succeed and a previous set no longer works. Rather, economic knowledge 
is base upon appraisal of accumulating and converging signs in 
anticipation of a turn in the short and in the long terms.  Such situated 
practices of knowledge are classically rhetorical, of course; in situations 
inviting deliberation leading to judgment and action, rhetoric is the art of 
marshaling timely reasons that critical appraise, properly motivate, and 
accord right standing in the choices at hand. Prudence is its virtue, 
contingency its limits, and an effectively choosing society its outcome. In 
this regard, Hayek’s knowledge agent acting as entrepreneur is in line 
with classic Aristotelian rhetoric. 
Modern theory offers altogether different opportunities and 
constraints for theory and practice. Theorization is the lynchpin of macro 
economic thinking that reads causes of economic behavior from 
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“aggregate” data.  Aggregate data are signals that are displayed over time 
and correlated to suggest economic success and failure in terms of 
meeting, exceeding or falling short of expectations.  The analysis of 
aggregates through economic formula yields knowledge of cause and 
effects unavailable to entrepreneurs seated in their situated choices of 
how to read behavior, set expectations, and decide.  Aggregates obscure 
more than they reveal, however, because factors composing the 
aggregates may wash out creating the appearance of an unchanged trend; 
but changes in make-up may signal turns that are building to threshold 
levels, with unexpected changes startling private and public planners 
alike who deploy aggregates to construct continuity of past into future.  
Useful knowledge needed to negotiate contingent circumstances “never 
exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits 
of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the 
separate individuals possess” (Hayek, 1945, 519).  Rhetorical weight then 
is constituted in the subjective impressions of the relevance, 
trustworthiness, and inter-reliability of the fragments. The rooting of 
judgment in singular cognitive translation of sense impressions has 
positioned Hayek as a champion of conservative individualism.  For 
Keynes these sense impressions are driven by “animal spirits” that are a 
feature of the herd, released from the caution of the day and hunting in 
the wiles of darkness.  Neither Hayek nor Keynes find that individual 
entrepreneurs, investors, or consumers carry out their activities with 
complete, exhaustive information; they disagree as to where the 
knowledge may be found, in the welter of practices meshing together 
rules for purposes of advantage or in the rules at play that can be deduced 
from outcomes. 
What is removed from sight in the positioning Hayek against Keynes 
is the social nature of learning which extends beyond the isolated 
individual at point of judgment to the formation of common sense over 
and against theory.  Hayek concludes, 
We need to remember only how much we have to learn in any 
occupation after we have completed our theoretical training, how 
big a part of our working life we spend learning particular jobs, 
and how valuable an asset in all walks of life is knowledge of 
people, of local conditions, and of special circumstances (Hayek, 
1945, 522)   
What is key to economic activity is not only making up expectations that 
are prudent but also reading them against expectations of others upon 
whose satisfactions work and reward depend.  So much does he depend 
upon this learning, that self-positioning occurs best in a world 
unquestioned and taken for granted.  Prices send signals. Price system 
itself is  
a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of 
telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch 
merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might 
watch the hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their activities to 
changes of which they may never know more than is reflected in 
the price movement (Hayek, 1937) 
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One can build upon habits through judgment by following the successful 
habits of practices and institutions that have built up over time and 
furnish foundations.  Those who cultivate the ability to critically appraise 
certain conditions or circumstances inviting intervention, even though 
tested by competition, will over the long run win. Yet, the very taken-for-
grantedness of reading signals as indicators presupposes a social world 
that underwrites the communication practices of the markets. 
The Austrian view has a social, rather than purely individualist basis, 
because it borrows its basic ideas of practical reason from Aristotle’s 
understanding of the virtues demanded by successfully managing 
household economy—a term broader than individual family or city-state 
circumstances.  Catallaxy--the order brought about by the mutual 
adjustment of many individual economies in a market--is at the roots of a 
knowledge economy where the grounds of prudence are woven into the 
cultures of practices, as the community addresses—presents, evaluates 
and judges--special cases with particular knowledge from a variety of 
interested sources.  Hayek finds Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
compelling: 
Nor is Prudence a knowledge of general principles only: it must 
also take account of particular facts, since it is concerned with 
action, and action deals with particular things. This is why men 
who are ignorant of general principles are sometimes more 
successful in action than others who know them: for instance, if a 
man knows that light meat is easily digested and therefore 
wholesome, but does not know what kinds of meat are light, he 
will not be so likely to restore you to health as a man who merely 
knows that chicken is wholesome; and in other matters men of 
experience are more successful than theorists. And Prudence is 
concerned with action, so one requires both forms of it, or indeed 
knowledge of particular facts even more than knowledge of 
general principles. Though here too there must be some supreme 
directing faculty (Aristotle, 1141b7) (Hayek, 1945) 
Ratio essendi in situations requiring action trumps ratio cognoscendi, 
which is powerless.  Note though that the virtuous deliberations are not 
solitary; rather, Aristotle’s rhetoric is a practical art, too, where the 
double-sided quality of signs point in conflicting directions and a practical 
art is necessary to sort, read, arrange, stylize, remember and order the 
common experiences through adjusting symbols in the interests of 
restraining or releasing action. Rhetoric offers an art of collaboration, not 
reducible to individual cognition.  Trust in practical reasoning takes its 
turns on the requirements to build confidence in lending and investing, 
the very strategies that enable expanding market activities. 
Capital investment carries forward classical epistemic traditions into 
modern thinking.  Capital investment is based upon expectations truly 
successful for the longer-term anticipation of wealth generation and 
apparently successful with the short-term response to opportunity.  As 
Steele explains:  
capital investment permits 'roundabout' methods of production 
(for example, machines are produced in order that commodities 
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can be produced; or land is drained in order that commodities 
may be grown). After a period of gestation, those capital 
investments yield earnings from the sale of the commodities 
whose production they make possible. 'Shallow' investments 
bring commodities to the market relatively quickly, but 'deep' (or, 
in modern terminology, highly capital-intensive) investments are 
technically (though not necessarily economically) more 
productive (Steele, 2001, 31).   
If capital is directed through planning, the policy will distort the sorting 
process by which genuine opportunities will attract long-term investment.  
Short-term stimuli will systematically distort investment as risk takers 
adjust their standing to pay-offs made opportune by government 
stimulus, thereby making “real recovery” less likely or longer to achieve.  
These views underscored Hayek’s view of economic recession, which 
occurs  
when an investment boom is sustained by easy credit, the 
implication is that investments are insufficiently covered by 
saving; consumption is too high and shortages will accumulate. A 
painful retrenchment is inevitable (Steele, 2001, 32) 
It seems to us that state central planning is not the only source of 
systematically distorted communication.  Rather, in the present recession, 
the state operated with large banks to enable a system underwritten by 
cronyism—reciprocal benefit of large institutions in the interest of power 
and profit at the expense of national and international investors.  
Conservative ideology was deployed as a universal to support the view 
that all state deregulation would result in more perfectly functioning free 
markets—removing protections against speculation that have been in 
effect since the last outrageous episode of the Great Depression.  Yet, 
unlike the Depression the freed up market forces were backed by explicit 
and implicit government guarantees of a bailout, should their appetites 
get too large—a bailout at the expense of the taxpayers. This situation 
moved moral hazard to the realm of a social rather than individual 
problem. Moral hazard occurs when leverage is encouraged because there 
are only benefits to be had by risk taking because an exogenous agent has 
guaranteed to pick up losses.  Moral hazard was a nineteenth century 
issue for the insurance industry.  Underwriters worried that if an 
individual were insured to a high level, then the motive to exercise normal 
caution would be reduced.   Insurance would create a moral hazard by 
motivating bad judgments in excessive risk-taking.  
Hayek’s thinking about distorting capital investment through systems of 
false signals inviting investment now can be extended to big banks whose 
derivatives are not regulated and so out of site of government, yet at the 
same time government has an implicit promise to provide rescue.   
Two cases are relevant.  First, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were started 
as government agencies, but had been privatized. Still their mortgage 
investment pools were attractive because as quasi-government agencies; 
they were backed by the US federal government.  Second, derivatives are 
volatile new instruments of financial engineering.  Leveraging 
investments may make the formulas volatile.  In 1997, a Wall Street bank 
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failure was mitigated by the action of the US federal government.  In 
2007, the added argument was “too big to fail,” which assured investors of 
the likelihood of a bailout, especially after the consequences of the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy were demonstrated.  The partnership 
between capital and government created moral hazards on a vast scale. 
Just as conservative advocates now blame Roosevelt for the length and 
breadth of the depression through interventionist fiscal and monetary 
policies, so they argue that current Keynesian interventions are failing—as 
predicted by Hayek.  Meghnad Desai and Robert Skidelsky of the 
Manchester Guardian, for example, conclude of quantitative easing:  
 
Wherever the money has gone, it is not into the real economy. A 
similar situation prevails in the US where, as Alan Greenspan 
pointed out in the Financial Times of 6 October, corporates are 
using the money supply to buy liquid assets rather than "real" 
investments. Consumers are also not spending but saving to 
deleverage, and even so consumer indebtedness is still dire. Much 
more deleveraging will have to be done before the negative wealth 
effect will vanish and spending resume .  This is very much what 
Hayek's theory leads one to expect. The crisis, he says, occurs 
because there has been a long run of cheap credit resulting in 
malinvestments, like today's sub-prime mortgages. Expectations 
of lending banks change, we have a reversal of cheap credit and 
the boom collapses (Desai & Skidelsky, 2010). 
While the analogy appears strong, a jump to non-intervention into market 
activities remains unwarranted, precisely because the ideology of 
apparent deregulation set the grounds for a mixed government-private 
distortion of risk signals.  Further, the articulation of change from war to 
peacetime economy does not speak to the habits of consumption and 
uncertainty that mark the tensions of a global economy.  All analogies are 
limited, to be sure; however, what disciplinary purity and ideological 
polarization accomplish by perfecting difference is to conceal key 
common grounds useful for understanding economic theories and 
practices in emergence and for achieving an informed policy consensus. 
 
Conclusion:  Then and Now 
A close reading of the actual exchange between the Keynes group and the 
Hayek group in the context of the letters in The Times of London that 
appeared before and concurrently with the exchange reveals that the 
positions developed, when appropriated by contemporary economists as 
clear and decisive arguments for or against practices like government 
stimulus or quantitative monetary easing, are considerably more 
ambiguous than claimed.  First, both groups orient their position in 
opposition to the previously valued British figure of the patriotic citizen 
who either hoards cash or gives it up in the forms of taxes, tariffs, or 
reduced bond income because these actions are said to be in the public 
interest.  Both see this figuration as an anachronistic extension of wartime 
attitudes that threatens economic instability by inducing deflationary 
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spirals.  This point of agreement is potentially devastating to 
contemporary proposals to cut government budgets by more than 50% in 
the interest of paying off national debts.  Second, neither group is 
persuaded to endorse the position that minimizing government 
expenditures is always justified by the “principles of economy” that 
conflate the economic model of exchange processes with the pursuit of 
efficiency in resource use to create a “fundamental economic law.”  Both 
the Hayek and Keynes groups worry not about inefficiency per se, but 
instances where public authorities move outside their areas of 
competency to undertake projects that are not closely connected to 
encouraging either private consumption or investment.  They do not 
participate in the broader presumption of “economy” and its radical 
opponents that government always or never wastes money, and thus 
refuses to grant or deny legitimacy to any particular activities.  Finally, 
both groups recognize the inherent role of uncertainty in economic 
decision-making, and thus the need for deliberation, argument, and 
collective choice at various moments in economic life.  Hayek does not 
think an economic system is an automatic decision making process. While 
they may differ strongly on the sources of uncertainty, both the Hayek 
group and the Keynes group preserve its contingent nature and 
constitutive force.  
This finding corresponds to G. R. Steele’s work in the interpretive 
history of economics as a discipline.  Steele distinguishes the arguments 
of these modern economists from classical, natural law beginnings. “Since 
all human action is directed towards changing some future state, 
uncertainty must pervade the outcome of every action that resides within 
the context of other people's actions”  (Steele, 2001, 162).  The first order 
question of uncertainty, of course, belongs to the market situated 
entrepreneur who must decide whether to buy or sell, or to pay more or 
less for a good, with capital to be used now or saved for later, in 
anticipation of producing more goods or simply increasing expected yield 
through higher prices.  The second order uncertainty extends to the 
investor who must decide whether to increase the levels of risk-taking or 
withdraw from market activity, to go with or against the general trends of 
the crowd, to continue or to cash in at every turn. Then too there is a third 
factor that produces a new level of uncertainty in the very act of trying to 
reduce it.  Economists gather data and craft models, make predictions 
and explain past outcomes. Practical judgments and theoretical models 
together push a third level of uncertainty, both in the comparative merits 
of theory and the new techniques of financial engineering built and 
certified by major institutions and the state.  It is for these reasons, all 
rooted in the probability revolution of late 19th and 20th century science, 
that neo-classical economics assumes an equilibrium which, in fact for 
Keynes and Hayek, markets struggle always to achieve and whose 
continuity always remains uncertain.  Keynes and Hayek both remind us 
of the contingent qualities of market practices, investment strategies, and 
theoretical models and apparatuses.  How issues of contingency are 
addressed defines generative rhetorics that influence the left and right 
politics of national governments that during times of crisis, in the Great 
Depression and in the current Great Recession, vary widely.  A rhetorical 
approach to economics addresses through appreciation and critique the 
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uncertainties constitutive of the times as well as the re-articulation of 
such moments when public values, theoretical models, and market 
practices are in change. Critical rhetoric work extends and complicates—
rather than purifies and uses--economic debates.  In the case of the 1932 
debates, we find areas of possible agreements between theorists, even 
while leaving room for differences. Close, constructive textual readings 
are necessary to reconstruct contingencies, block conversion of 
articulated positions to universal theoretical principles, and recollect and 
reconstruct the fuller, informed range of discussion in the interests of 
competent public policy. 
In the end, partisan and ideological uses of the Keynes-Hayek debate 
to fortify the case against state intervention allow market fraud to go 
unchecked.  Free-market slogans legitimated a scheme by the state and 
banks to render liquid the American housing market, creating a new 
debtor class.  In the last two years, 4 million Americans have been thrown 
out of their houses, a quarter of all home owners (19 million families) owe 
more on their homes than the market value, and credit card bankruptcy 
laws were revised in 2005 in anticipation of the unsustainability of the 
bubble.  Hayek demanded the protection of common law against the 
planning of the state.  In the recent debt bubble, the government’s 
supposed commitment to free enterprise in fact engaged in a planning 
scheme that resulted in a massive transfer of wealth, a credit crunch, and 
a huge transfer of home ownership back to the banks.  Systematically 
distorted communication transforms the taken-for-granted signal sending 
qualities of the market into lures, traps, and eventually triumphs of 
planned wealth shifts.  The problem, of course, is that these are not 
sustainable and without Keynesian intervention the triumph may be so 
complete that recovery may be long in arriving.  A complete rhetoric is 
brought into play only when ratio essendi links with a powerful, critical 
counterpart in ratio cognoscendi—the shared common grounds of 
contingent policy choice in a political economy. 
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